When Are Nudges Desirable? Benefit Validity When Preferences Are Not Consistently Revealed.

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  • Additional Information
    • NAICS/Industry Codes:
      921190 Other General Government Support
    • Abstract:
      Cost‐benefit analysis, as a tool of general use in policy analysis or as a mandated analytical process in some rulemaking, provides protocols for assessing the relative efficiency of policy alternatives. However, inconsistent and apparently irrational decisions by consumers in some situations call into question the validity of inferring the values that consumers place on outcomes from their observed choices. It also opens the door for "nudges" that change the architecture of choice to promote more "rational" consumer choice. Differences between decision utility and experience utility and the willingness of consumers to pay for reductions in temptation provide conceptual bases for thinking about the efficiency of nudges. However, assessment of nudges and their role in behavioral public administration should also recognize that heterogeneous preferences can result in increases in utility for some and decreases for others. Therefore, nudges require systematic assessment like other policy instruments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
    • Abstract:
      Copyright of Public Administration Review is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)
    • Author Affiliations:
      1University of Wisconsin–Madison
    • Full Text Word Count:
      9361
    • ISSN:
      0033-3352
    • Accession Number:
      10.1111/puar.13114
    • Accession Number:
      140974640
  • Citations
    • ABNT:
      WEIMER, D. L. When Are Nudges Desirable? Benefit Validity When Preferences Are Not Consistently Revealed. Public Administration Review, [s. l.], v. 80, n. 1, p. 118–126, 2020. DOI 10.1111/puar.13114. Disponível em: http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=bsu&AN=140974640. Acesso em: 6 dez. 2020.
    • AMA:
      Weimer DL. When Are Nudges Desirable? Benefit Validity When Preferences Are Not Consistently Revealed. Public Administration Review. 2020;80(1):118-126. doi:10.1111/puar.13114
    • APA:
      Weimer, D. L. (2020). When Are Nudges Desirable? Benefit Validity When Preferences Are Not Consistently Revealed. Public Administration Review, 80(1), 118–126. https://doi.org/10.1111/puar.13114
    • Chicago/Turabian: Author-Date:
      Weimer, David L. 2020. “When Are Nudges Desirable? Benefit Validity When Preferences Are Not Consistently Revealed.” Public Administration Review 80 (1): 118–26. doi:10.1111/puar.13114.
    • Harvard:
      Weimer, D. L. (2020) ‘When Are Nudges Desirable? Benefit Validity When Preferences Are Not Consistently Revealed’, Public Administration Review, 80(1), pp. 118–126. doi: 10.1111/puar.13114.
    • Harvard: Australian:
      Weimer, DL 2020, ‘When Are Nudges Desirable? Benefit Validity When Preferences Are Not Consistently Revealed’, Public Administration Review, vol. 80, no. 1, pp. 118–126, viewed 6 December 2020, .
    • MLA:
      Weimer, David L. “When Are Nudges Desirable? Benefit Validity When Preferences Are Not Consistently Revealed.” Public Administration Review, vol. 80, no. 1, Jan. 2020, pp. 118–126. EBSCOhost, doi:10.1111/puar.13114.
    • Chicago/Turabian: Humanities:
      Weimer, David L. “When Are Nudges Desirable? Benefit Validity When Preferences Are Not Consistently Revealed.” Public Administration Review 80, no. 1 (January 2020): 118–26. doi:10.1111/puar.13114.
    • Vancouver/ICMJE:
      Weimer DL. When Are Nudges Desirable? Benefit Validity When Preferences Are Not Consistently Revealed. Public Administration Review [Internet]. 2020 Jan [cited 2020 Dec 6];80(1):118–26. Available from: http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=bsu&AN=140974640