ADAPTACIÓN DE ALGORITMOS GENÉTICOS EN LA SIMULACIÓN DEL COMPORTAMIENTO ESTRATÉGICO DE LOS AGENTES CONTAMINADORES ANTE EL COBRO DE TASAS RETRIBUTIVAS.

Item request has been placed! ×
Item request cannot be made. ×
loading   Processing Request
  • Additional Information
    • Alternate Title:
      Adapting Genetic Algorithms to Simulate the Strategic Behavior of Contaminating Agent Companies regarding Retribution Tax Charges.
    • Abstract:
      Colombian environmental legislation has resorted to an economic instrument called retribution tax -based on the mechanism proposed by Baumol and Oates in their 1973 paper-, to regulate the contamination of bodies of water. This article employs standard genetic algorithms to simulate the behavior of a set of artificial companies that spill contaminants into bodies of water, when they are faced with a uniform tax charge with the same characteristics as the retribution tax. The simulations are aimed at reproducing company behavior in distinct tax application scenarios, for the purpose of evaluating their efficiency and proposing measures aimed at improvement. Such assessment is needed because the contaminating companies have adopted a strategic behavior that Baumol and Oates did not contemplate. It is due to the companies' limited rationality and to the environmental authority's but partial compliance with its invoicing and monitoring activities. The article concludes that, faced with such strategic behavior by the contaminating agent companies, a non-declared higher contamination tax would increase the effectiveness of the control instrument. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
    • Abstract:
      La legislación ambiental colombiana ha acudido al instrumento económico denominado tasas retributivas -fundamentado en el mecanismo propuesto por Baumol y Oates, en su trabajo de 1973-, para regular la contaminación de los cuerpos de agua. El artIculo emplea los algoritmos genéticos estándar para simular el comportamiento de un conjunto de empresas artificiales con vertimientos contaminantes sobre cuerpos de agua, ante el cobro de un impuesto uniforme, con las mismas características que las tasas retributivas. Las simulaciones intentan reproducir el comportamiento de las empresas bajo distintos escenarios de aplicación del instrumento, con el propósito de evaluar su eficiencia y proponer medidas tendientes a mejorarlo. La necesidad de esa evaluación surge del comportamiento estratégico de las empresas contaminadoras, no contemplado por Baumol y Oates y originado por su racionalidad limitada, y del cumplimiento parcial de la autoridad ambiental de sus actividades de facturación y monitoreo. Se concluye que ante el comportamiento estratégico de los contaminadores, un mayor impuesto a la contaminación no declarada elevarla la efectividad del instrumento de control. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
    • Abstract:
      Copyright of Cuadernos de Administración (01203592) is the property of Pontificia Universidad Javeriana and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)